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  Two common policy instruments used by governments around the world to increase the 
availability of basic telephony (i.e., local, long distance, and international service) have been: (1) 
award monopoly rights on basic services to cross-subsidize residential local telephony; and (2) 
separate vertically (i.e., structural separation) the owner of the local fixed network from the 
provider of long distance or international telephone services.  I use data from a panel of 67 
countries during the seven years following the privatization of the telephone monopoly and find 
that contrary to wide spread beliefs: (1) monopoly on basic services is not associated with lower 
residential telephony prices; quite the opposite, monopoly increases residential local prices; (2) 
monopoly does not help universal service provision and lowers the use of international 
telephony; and (3) mandatory vertical separation reduces international telephony usage and the 
number of fixed lines in service.  In summary, monopoly and vertical separation harm those 
consumers that they were precisely designed to help: the downstream (business) users of 
international telephony and the upstream users of residential local telephony. 
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Consequences of Vertical Separation and Monopoly: 
Evidence from Telecom Privatizations 
 




The privatization of the telephone monopolies around the world presented policy 
makers with an unprecedented opportunity to re-structure the whole industry.  Once the 
sale was decided (but before it was undertaken), governments needed to make two major 
policy decisions. First, they needed to decide whether the status quo of monopoly was to 
be maintained; second, they needed to decide whether they should mandate structural 
separation between the upstream local fixed telephony service and downstream services 
such as long distance or international telephony.
1  The argument in favor of awarding 
monopoly rights was political.  For decades governments had pursued a policy of 
universal telephone service (i.e., a phone line in each home) by subsidizing residential 
local telephony from business telephony (i.e., long distance, international, and data 
communications services);
2 this cross-subsidy scheme could only be maintained under 
monopoly.  Moreover, local fixed telephony was considered a natural monopoly while 
business services such as long distance or international telephony were deemed 
potentially competitive.  In this view, allowing entry on basic telephony (i.e., local, long 
distance and international service) would not engender competition in local telephony 
while entrants on the lucrative market for business telephony would drive down the 
prices of these services.  An increase on local residential rates would follow as the 
incumbent local service monopoly would struggle to maintain the level of profits it 
enjoyed before.  This was deemed politically unacceptable.
3  To avoid this problem, it 
                                            
1 Few privatizing governments such as India, Canada, Japan and others inherited a vertically separated 
industry. In other cases such as Argentina and Brazil the decision was taken just before privatization. 
2 Empirical evidence suggests that local residential services were priced at below marginal cost while 
business services such as long distance and international telephony were priced at well above marginal cost 
(Nambu, Suzuki, and Honda 1989; Crandall 1989; Palmer 1992. Hausman, Tardiff, and Belinfante 1993; 
Cronin, Colleran, Miller, and Raczkowski 1997).  
3 Although the argument for monopoly (and cross subsidization) was mainly political, Faulhaber (1975) 
found an economic justification.  He proved that cross subsidization can increase social welfare as long as a 
multi-product monopolist exhibits economies of scope on joint production.  2 
 
was argued, monopoly and cross subsidization needed to be maintained.
4  As it will 
become clear later, this policy choice had the opposite effect. 
The validity of this argument is suspect on several grounds.  For example, it 
ignores gains on productive efficiency arising from the privatization of these firms.   
Private property exerts a powerful incentive to use resources more efficiently than under 
state control (Alchian 1965; Alchian 1969; and Furubotn and Pejovich 1972).   
Improvements on efficiency would reduce production costs and the price of telephone 
services holding all else constant.  These gains in efficiency are compounded when 
considering the effect of competition.  Product market competition affects managerial 
behavior reducing the consumption of perquisites and increasing productive efficiency  
(Alchian and Kessel 1962; Williamson 1963; Leibenstein 1966; Comanor and 
Leibenstein 1969).  Part of these efficiency gains would be passed along to the consumers 
in the form of lower prices.
5 
A second major policy decision was that of vertically separating the provision of 
local fixed service from long distance or international service.  This time the argument 
was on economic grounds and supporters came from the pro-competition side.
6  The 
argument closely follows the modification of the final judgment (MFJ) rationale used in 
                                            
4 Bös (1993: 108) articulates this view clearly: “In contrast to private firms, public enterprises have often 
been instructed to price according to distributional objectives. This implies charging lower prices for goods 
which are mainly demanded by lower-income earners.  In this case the public enterprises rely on internal 
subsidization, where the internal deficit of the low-priced goods is financed by the internal profits earned 
from sales to higher-income or business customers.  If the privatized firm operates in a competitive market, 
this internal subsidization becomes impossible and distributional pricing cannot be upheld.”  Pilcher (1994:  
401) puts it bluntly: “Governments, therefore, need to decide on a strategy to either introduce competition 
in long-distance and international service or to maintain the cross-subsidy.” 
5 Off course, observed prices may increase when other things are changing.  For example, after the U.S. 
allowed competition on basic telephony, local residential prices increased; however, this did not produce a 
decline on the amount of residential subscribers and thus did not produce a set back on the stated policy of 
universal telephone service (Hausman, Tardiff, and Belinfante 1993; Cronin, Colleran, Miller and 
Raczkowski 1997).  These results are driven by: (1) the low elasticity of demand for local access in the US; 
and (2) households perceive local and long distance services as complements.  Noting ensures that these 
conditions prevail in other parts of the world. 
 
6This view is spelled out by Bös (1993: 108) clearly: “The government should first attempt to encourage 
competition, as the UK, for instance, did with its splitting of the electricity industry into electricity 
generation (a potentially competitive business) and distribution.”  Also Waterschoot (1994: 511) 
underscores the influence of the MFJ that split vertically AT&T in shaping the post-privatization regulation 
of telecommunications around the world: “The influence of UNITED STATES ANTITRUST legislation in 
shaping the structure of telecommunications cannot be questioned.  Divestiture of AT&T, rather than 
control over rates applied by the dominant carriers, was the main regulatory feature leading to increased 
competition in long-distance telecommunications services.”   3 
 
the U.S. to justify the split of AT&T into several local fixed telephony providers and one 
long distance and international service provider.  Briefly stated, the argument assumes 
that competition in local fixed telephony will not arise because of its natural monopoly 
characteristics while long distance and international service were viewed as potentially 
competitive.  Supporters of mandatory vertical separation (also called structural 
separation) aim at increasing competition on the (potentially) competitive services.  In 
their view, a vertically integrated local monopoly can effectively keep potential entrants 
out of the lucrative long distance and international telephony markets by using non 
competitive tactics.  For example, the vertically integrated firm can tie the monopolized 
local service with long distance and international service eliminating competitors in the 
latter markets.  After competitors are driven out, the integrated firm can raise the price of 
the tied good reducing social welfare (Whinston 1990).  Because the vertically integrated 
firm owns the monopolized local fixed network it can refuse to interconnect; delay 
interconnection through lengthy negotiations (Salop and Scheffman 1983); or it can 
provide low quality access links to degrade the service quality of competitors (Cremer, 
Rey, and Tirole 2000; Aviram 2003).   This would result in too little competition in the 
downstream markets (i.e., long distance or international service). Moreover, analysts and 
policy makers feared that a vertically integrated local monopoly would use rate regulation 
to shift costs from the production of competitive services such as long distance to the 
monopolized local residential service.  This would enable the vertically integrated local 
monopoly to use predatory pricing to keep competitors at bay on the downstream markets 
while recovering the losses with higher regulated prices in local service.
7 Vertical 
separation was seen as a remedy for these problems; it was supposed to keep residential 
prices low and boast competition on downstream services such as long distance and 
international telephony.  Although these arguments seem plausible to a first 
approximation, they overlook several important issues.  First, with open entry predatory 
pricing on the competitive downstream markets is unlikely to succeed because once 
prices are raised it will induce entry by new firms.
8  Second, it overlooks the incentive 
                                            
7 See Sappington (1995). 
8 One variant of this is when a monopolist is also the least cost producer and these costs cannot be observed  
by others. In this case the monopolist can use limit pricing to prevent entry (Milgrom and Roberts 1982; 4 
 
effect that competition has on productive efficiency. Even if we accept that the prices of 
regulated local service may increase due to cost shifting, this increase on prices will 
attract entry on local service which in turn will reduce prices and put pressure on firms to 
reduce costs.  Part of the improvements on productive efficiency will be passed along to 
the consumers in the form of lower prices for local service.  Third and most important; 
firms integrate to minimize the transaction costs of using the market (Coase 1937).   
Breaking up a firm by administrative process in the hope that social welfare would 
increase should be regarded as a perilous road to follow.  It implies that the loss in 
efficiency after the break up more than compensates the gains; nothing ensures this.   
Indeed, Williamson (1971) identified several cases in which vertical separation may be 
inefficient: (1) when this creates bilateral monopolies (i.e., double marginalization 
problem), (2) when bargaining (transaction) costs between parties are likely to be high, or 
(3) when large sunk investments are part of a transaction with incomplete contracts.   
Coincidentally, the contracting arrangements of a vertically separated local telephone 
monopoly with a downstream international or long distance service provider seem to 
have most of the characteristics just mentioned. These contractual relationships involve 
investment decisions that are asset-specific and therefore subject to a high risk of 
opportunistic behavior to appropriate quasi-rents (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978; 
Williamson 1985). Indeed, when we observe integration within a firm this indicates that 
the firm’s assets are interdependent (Alchian 1984).  When assets or investment decisions 
are interdependent, profit maximizing firms will integrate (Williamson 1979), and 
integration under a set of plausible assumptions would increase social welfare (Riordan 
and Williamson 1985; Grossman and Hart 1986).
9   
In this article I test whether monopoly and vertical separation have any effect on 
the provision of basic telephone service (i.e., local, long distance, and international 
service).  I extend Wallsten’s (2004) study increasing the sample of countries and adding 
a new policy variable: mandatory vertical separation.  Several authors have found a 
                                                                                                                                  
Tirole 1988, Chapter 9). Note that the low-cost monopolist can effectively prevent entry but it will need to 
charge a price lower than the monopoly level and thus social welfare would increase.    
9 De Graba (1996) also shows that when goods are complementary, tying and foreclosing competitors can 
increase social welfare.  In a related contribution to the theory of vertical integration, Arrow (1975) showed 
that firms will integrate vertically when there is uncertainty in the supply of the upstream (intermediate) 
good. 5 
 
negative effect of monopoly on the provision of basic telephony across countries.
10  
However, vertical separation has attracted little to no attention.  My sample consists of 67 
countries that privatized their former state-owned monopoly in the past two decades. For 
each country I use data for seven years following the privatization sale and find that 
monopoly harms the provision of international and local fixed telephony by reducing the 
usage of international service and increasing the price of residential local service.  Fear of 
increases in residential telephony prices due to competition in the post-privatization years 
was unfounded.  Contrary to common assertions, vertical separation harms the expansion 
of downstream phone services such as international telephony suggesting that the 
rationale behind the MFJ in the U.S. and applied in many countries is actually flawed.
11  
Also important; vertical separation harms the expansion of local fixed telephony; an issue 
largely overlooked in the policy debate of the pre-privatization years. 
 
2.The Data 
My dataset includes 67 countries that privatized the dominant telephone firm in 
the period 1984-2003.  This period covers most of the worldwide privatizations of 
telephone firms.  Some countries have multiple sales of blocks of equity in this period.  I 
identified the date of the earliest sale as the privatization date.  The main source for these 
data is Privatisation International (monthly issues) and the Privatisation International 
Yearbook (annual issues).  I recorded every upcoming or completed privatization of a 
telephone firm.  Additional data on sales transactions were gathered from the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency’s database on privatizations (Privatization Link)
12 and 
from the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Viewswire and Country Information databases to 
cover the feasible universe of sales transactions. Next, I collected information on the 
vertical structure of the telephone industry; namely whether basic telephone services (i.e.,
                                            
10 See for example Ros (1999), and Fink et al (2003).  For a study closely related to this (circumscribed to 
the post-privatization years) see Wallsten (2004). 
11 See Alchian (1995), Sappington (1995), and Crandall and Sidak (2002). 
12 Available at http://www.privatizationlink.com 6 
 
Table 1: Definition of variables and sources 
Variable Definition  Source 
    
Dependent variables   
    
Intl. minutes  Number of outgoing international minutes per person in year t. 
 
ITU. WTI 2004  
Fixed lines/pop  The country’s fixed telephone lines in service per person in year t. 
 
ITU. WTI 2004  
Res Price1  The price of one year of residential local fixed service in year t. Res Price 1 = Connection charge + 12 
x monthly rate. In US dollars of 2005. 
 
ITU. WTI 2004  
Res Price2  The price of residential local fixed service in year t (perpetuity formula with a discount rate of 5 
percent). Res Price2 = Connection charge + monthly rate/0.05. In US dollars of 2005. 
 
ITU. WTI 2004  
Explanatory variables   
    
Intl. monopoly  Number of years until end of monopoly on international telephony in year t. 
 
Own database 
Local monopoly  Number of years until end of monopoly on local fixed telephony in year t. 
 
Own database 









Income  Country’s real GDP per capita (thousand PPP US dollars of 2005) in year t. 
  
World Bank. WDI 
2004 
Foreign born  Stock of foreign-born population in year t (% of total population) 
 
World Bank. WDI 
2004 
Tourists  Annual tourist arrivals in year t (% of total population).  
 
World Bank. WDI 
2004 
Inflation 25+  Dummy variable has the value of one if annual inflation is higher than 25 percent and zero otherwise.  World Bank. WDI 7 
 
  2004 
Left-wing  Dummy variable has the value of one if the chief executive is classified as left-wing and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Beck et al (2001). 
The World Bank. 
DPI 2004. 
Fixed lines/pop  The country’s fixed telephone lines in service per person in year t. 
 
ITU. WTI 2004  
Urban  Proportion of people living in urban areas (% population). 
 
World Bank. WDI 
2004 
Paved roads  Density of paved roads. Kilometers of paved roads divided by a country’s surface area at time t 
(km/square kilometers). 
 
World Bank. WDI 
2004 





Mobile  The country’s number of cellular mobile subscriber per person in year t. 
 
ITU. WTI 2004  
Vehicles  The number of vehicles per thousand people in year t. 
 
World Bank. WDI 
2004 
Pop 0-14  Population in the range of 0 to 14 years old at time t (% of total) 
 
World Bank. WDI 
2004 
Fixed lines  The number of fixed lines in service at time t (million lines). 
 
ITU. WTI 2004  
Faults  The number of telephone faults per 100 main lines at time t. 
 
ITU. WTI 2004  
Digital  Percentage of digitalization of the main fixed line network in year t (% of total).  ITU. WTI 2004  
ITU = International Telecommunications Union.  WTI = World Telecommunications Indicators.  WDI = World Development Indicators.  DPI = Database of 
Political Institutions. 8 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics   
Variable   Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Intl.  minutes    397  51.760 75.255  0.213 466.096 
Fixed lines/pop   397  0.269  0.197  0.004  0.745 
Res Price2   375  343.490  292.830  7.005  3,611.444 
Res Price1  375  265.394  262.988  4.606  3,441.068 
Intl. monopoly   400  3.315  7.450  -10  36 
Local monopoly   400  3.018  7.527  -10  36 
Basic monopoly   400  3.166  7.452  -10  36 
Vertical separation   397  3.655  11.083  0  51 
Income  399 13.505 9.948  1.119 40.297 
Foreign-born    402  8.665 12.072 0.114 76.474 
Tourists    286  50.222 54.307  0.228 235.822 
Urban   405  64.239  18.519  21.070  100 
Paved roads   297  0.825  1.083  0.001  4.516 
Inflation 25+   405  0.099  0.299  0  1 
Left-wing 405  0.346  0.476  0  1 
Durable   383  30.159  32.040  0  153 
(Durable )
2 383  1,933.475  3,798.334  0  23,409 
Mobile   397  0.163  0.234  0  0.937 
Vehicles   292  256.530  187.854  5.360  609.632 
Fixed lines   405  6.068  10.227  0.006  60.69 
Faults   287  38.308  42.381  0.5  228 
Digital   392  78.977  25.736  0.8  100 
Pop 0-14   405  27.311  9.545  14.209  46.420 
       
 
fixed local telephony, national long distance, or international telephony) were vertically 
integrated or not.  In addition, I collected data on the number of years since the industry 
was vertically separated and on the years of monopoly awarded to the privatized firms.  
These data were mainly collected from the Economist Intelligence Unit Viewswire and 
Country Information database, each firm’s annual reports, each country regulator’s 
websites, and from the Commission of the European Communities. I also gathered 
information of basic telephony usage from the International Telecommunications Union’s 
World Telecommunication Indicators (2004).  Country-wide data such as income and 
population were obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
database. Table 1 presents the full list of variables used along with definitions and 
sources while Table 2 shows the summary statistics. 
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3. Empirical Analysis 
 
In this section I test the effect of monopoly and vertical separation on international 
and local telephony.  I use panel data estimation with unobserved heterogeneity assumed 
to be time-invariant and specific to each country.  My unit of analysis is a country at time 
t.  For each country I use eight years of data starting with the year in which the first 
privatization sale took place (t0) and ending seven years later (t0 +7).  I want to estimate 
the following equation: 
it it it i it w x c y µ γ β + + + = ,                       (1) 
where yit is a vector that contains observations of an indicator of basic telephony  in 
country i at time t; ci is the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity of county i which 
may be arbitrarily correlated with xit and wit. Matrix xit contains observations in country i 
at time t of a set of industry or country variables.  wit is a matrix containing observations 
in country i at time t of the two policy variables of interest: monopoly and vertical 
separation. 
The fixed effect transformation provides consistent estimators of β and γ as long 
as the xit and wit are uncorrelated (conditional on ci) with the error term uit in equation 
one.  As it will become clear later, some of my xit may violate this strict exogeneity 
assumption. For example if past values of yit are correlated with future values of xit strict 
exogeneity is violated and fixed-effect estimates will be inconsistent (Wooldridge 2002: 
265-7).  On the other hand, my policy variables (wit) do not seem to violate strict 
exogeneity.  Past or current values of yit do not seem to affect future or current values of 
wit (my policy variables). The reason being is that once governments decide to privatize 
they need to set the terms of the license before the sale.  Important terms that 
governments need to establish are whether they would award monopoly rights and 
whether the privatized firm will be barred from the provision of upstream or downstream 
services (i.e., vertical separation); these are the variables in matrix wit.  Once these terms 
are set, they are part of a contract and remain fixed for the entire period of the license 
agreement which may extend over 20 or 25 years. 
Governments set these terms through several mechanisms which may include the 
legislature passing a new telecommunications law; the executive changing regulations of 10 
 
entry; the executive drafting license or concession contracts; or more often a combination 
of these.  Of course, changes in regulations and the terms of the license agreement are 
shaped by interest groups, government’s preferences and political institutions prevailing 
at one point in time;
13  but once the decision on the license terms is made, these remain 
fixed.  Therefore, past values of yit (say yit-1 or yit-2) are uncorrelated with wit, and thus, 
strict exogeneity is not violated. 
Some studies argue that policy variables should be treated as endogenous. Besley 
and Case (2000) analyze the influence of worker’s compensation insurance (the policy 
variable) on economic variables such as wages or employment (the dependent variable).  
They rightly stress the need to treat worker’s compensation (the policy variable) as 
endogenous because state regulators frequently change the amount of indemnity 
payments or reimbursements for medical expenses.  These changes in turn may be 
influenced by past wages and employment level (the dependent variable). A similar 
argument is made by Duso and Röller (2003) in the context of entry in cellular telephony.  
They rightly point out that the amount of licensed cellular providers (the policy variable) 
is endogenous when the dependent variable is the number of mobile subscribers per 
worker.  The reason why this variable is endogenous is that the regulator has discretion to 
award new licenses for mobile telephony and thus, one can plausibly argue that current or 
past values of mobile subscribers (the dependent variable) may influence future or current 
decisions on whether to grant one more cellular license or not. 
This situation is very different from the one encountered at the time of the 
privatization of the dominant fixed network provider.  If the license terms granted ten 
years of monopoly to the firm, regulators have no authority to unilaterally alter the terms 
of this contract during the duration of the license.
14  Therefore, whether a policy variable 
should be regarded as endogenous depends on the specific case under analysis.  As 
Besley and Case (2000: 674) conclude: “investigating the determinants of policies is an 
important prerequisite to understanding when and whether one can legitimately put 
                                            
13 See Viani (2005) for an analysis of the factors influencing the length of monopoly rights awarded in the 
privatization of telephone firms. 
14 In fact, many countries sought to increase the credibility of their commitment by signing the Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes with the International Centre of Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID).  This intends to circumvent poor systems of rule of law prevailing in many less 
developed countries (http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/main.htm). 11 
 
policy on the right hand side…(…)…the source of policy variation must be fully 
understood by the researcher.” 
The approach I follow here is similar to that used by Papke (1994) to analyze the 
effect of enterprise zones on the performance of the local economy (the yit). Although 
designation of enterprise zones could be correlated with unobserved variables affecting 
yit; once a community is designated as enterprise zone, it remains as such during the 
period of analysis.  Therefore, future values of designation (the policy variable) do not 
depend on past performance of the local economy (past values of yit) and as such 
designation is considered strictly exogenous.
15 
 
3.1 Effect of vertical separation and monopoly on international telephony 
I test the hypothesis that vertical separation increases competition and therefore 
output on international telephony (i.e, the rationale behind the MFJ in the US and applied 
in some countries around the world).  I focus on output rather than competition.  Country 
data on long distance calls is limited so I use the more readily available data on 
international outgoing minutes. I test the following null hypothesis: 
H01:  Vertical separation of local fixed service from international service increases 
international telephony usage.  
In addition, I want to test whether monopoly has any effect on international 
telephony; therefore I test a second null hypothesis: 
H02:  Monopoly has no effect on international telephony usage. 
I estimate equation one using the natural logarithm of outgoing international minutes  
per person in country i at time t as the dependent variable (yit).  In matrix wit I include 
observations of my two policy variables: monopoly and vertical separation.  I expect 
monopoly to be negatively correlated with output on international service.  Rate 
regulation could in theory make the monopolist price at Ramsey levels increasing output 
and social welfare.  In practice, regulators face a tremendous problem of asymmetric 
information because they cannot observe, nor elicit accurate information on costs from 
regulated firms. Given that rate regulation typically incorporates an implicit rate of 
return, inefficiency has zero (or low) cost to the regulated monopoly and rational utility-12 
 
maximizing managers will increase the consumption of perquisites producing a decline 
on productive efficiency (Sappington 1980).
16 
I assume monopolies may behave differently if they hold monopoly rights for, say, 20 
years instead of two years. Thus, my monopoly variable is continuous and denotes the 
remaining number of years of monopoly on international service.  I apply a similar 
rationale for vertical separation and use a continuous variable denoting the number of 
years since the dominant fixed telephone provider was excluded from the provision of 
downstream international telephony.  I expect a negative relationship between vertical 
separation and international telephony usage. Mandatory vertical separation increases the 
risk of opportunistic behavior and transaction costs (Williamson 1971, Klein, Crawford, 
and Alchian 1978; Williamson 1985) which in turn reduces efficiency.  Agreements 
between downstream and upstream firms on access fees require lengthy negotiations.  
Typically if no agreement is reached within a reasonable time frame the regulator 
determines the level of access fees necessary to compensate the fixed network owner for 
using his property.  It can hardly be emphasized the large information burden imposed on 
a regulator trying to estimate optimal Ramsey access fees.
17  Optimal access fees become  
even more elusive if we consider the political process by which they are set.  Self-
interested politicians and bureaucrats may choose a set of access fees far from the optimal 
levels as they do not bear the full cost of these choices. This would also invite rent-
seeking activities (Tullock 1967, Posner 1975) increasing further the welfare losses due 
to mandatory vertical separation. 
In matrix xit I include a set of exogenous variables that affect the quantity 
demanded of international telephony.  For example, I include the real income per capita. 
If international service is a normal good I expect a positive relationship between income 
and the amount of international minutes used. I also control for the number of foreign-
born residents and the number of tourist arrivals per year.  Foreign-born residents and 
tourists have family members abroad with whom they like to communicate; therefore, I 
expect these two variables to have a positive effect on international telephone usage. 
                                                                                                                                  
15 See also Wooldridge (2002: 306) 
16 For a good illustration of this and related problems see Berg and Tschirhart (1988: 505-511).  See 
Alchian and Kessel (1962), Williamson (1963), Leibenstein (1966) and Comanor and Leibenstein (1969) 
for the effect of monopoly on the consumption of perquisites. 13 
 
Finally, I add the number of fixed lines per person as a right-hand side variable.  Local 
access and international service are complementary goods because one cannot make an 
international call without local access.  Except for fixed lines per person, all other 
variables seem to be strictly exogenous.  It seems highly unlikely that current or past 
values of international telephony usage (yit) will cause an increase on future immigration, 
tourist arrivals, or income (my variables in xit).  However, the level of past international 
telephony usage may affect the amount of future lines in service violating strict 
exogeneity.  This seems plausible if we consider that international telephony (and other 
services aimed mainly at businesses) has traditionally been an important source of funds 
for the expansion of the fixed telephone network.
18  To overcome this potential 
endogeneity problem I use two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation.  As instruments I 
use all the exogenous regressors plus two additional ones: (1) the degree of urbanization, 
and (2) the density of paved roads in a country.  Urbanization and road density should be 
partially correlated with fixed lines per person but uncorrelated with international 
telephony usage.  The cost of digging trenches, laying down cables, and interconnecting 
towns and cities is lowered as the amount of people per mile of cable increases (i.e., as 
urbanization increases) and as the number of miles of paved roads increase.
19  I expect a 
positive partial correlation between these instruments and fixed lines per person.  The 
results of the first-stage regression (see column one in appendix) suggests that these are 
suitable instruments because their coefficients are highly significant, exhibit the expected 
sign, and can plausibly be regarded as uncorrelated with international telephony usage.  
Finally, I include year dummy variables to control for unobserved technological changes 
in the telecommunications industry; a dummy variable to control for high inflation, and a 
dummy variable to control for the existence of a left-wing chief executive.  High inflation 
erodes the real price of basic telephone services because these prices are regulated and 
thus, cannot adjust automatically with inflation.  Regulated firms need approval from the 
regulator before increasing their prices; this process could take weeks or months. In a 
                                                                                                                                  
17 For a theoretical exposition of this see Laffont and Tirole (2000: 80-83 and 97-105). 
18 For example in 1991 the share of international service on total revenue for the Jamaican telephone 
monopoly was 77 percent (Wint 1996: 59). 
19 For example Limão and Venables (2001:452) found that poor road infrastructure increases transport cost 
and reduces trade flows across countries. They state that “poor infrastructure accounts for 40 percent of 
predicted transport costs for coastal countries and up to 60 percent for landlocked countries.” 14 
 
highly inflationary environment real prices would fall and the quantity demanded of 
international telephony would increase holding all else constant.  On the other hand, if the 
head of the executive branch belongs to a left-wing party, I expect the regulator (typically 
part of the executive branch) to subsidize the price of residential service with this subsidy 
being paid by business users.  Because businesses are heavy users of international 
telephony, I expect the price of this service to increase and the quantity demanded to 
decline.  
I follow Wooldridge (2002:282-283) and Drukker’s (2003) procedure to test for 
first-order serial correlation on the error terms within countries (clusters) and found 
evidence of it.  Accordingly, I report robust standard errors that correct for 
heteroskedasticity and within country (cluster) correlation assuming independence 
between countries.
20  Finally, I use Hausman procedure (Hausman 1978, 1983) to test 
whether fixed lines per person (in logs) can plausibly be regarded as endogenous.   
Surprisingly, I cannot reject the hypothesis that this variable is exogenous.
21  Therefore, I 
present the results using OLS and 2SLS estimation in Table 3.  Using the results from 
2SLS estimation I reject the null hypothesis H01 with 95 percent confidence.  The 
purported benefits of baring the local fixed line operator from downstream services (i.e., 
international telephony), does not exist.  Although the US is not part of my sample, it is 
reassuring to know that my conclusions agree with the findings after the break up of 
AT&T.  The US experience indicates that vertical separation did not produce the 
expected efficiency gains because access charges to long distance and international 
service providers were kept high to keep local residential rates subsidized preventing 
lower prices on long distance and international service (Crandall 1988; Crandall 1989; 
Hausman, Tardiff and Belinfante 1993).  Using the results from OLS estimation I can 
also reject H01 but only with 80 percent confidence.  As Crandall and Sidak (2004: 410) 
                                            
20 See Froot (1989) and Williams (2000). 
21 Table 3 shows (at the bottom) the p-values of rejecting incorrectly the null hypothesis (H0) in Hausman’s 
test; where H0 is the hypothesis that fixed lines per person (in logs) is exogenous. 15 
 
Table 3: Effect of monopoly and vertical separation on outgoing international minutes per person. 
       
    Dependent Variable = Log Intl. minutes    
     Variable   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Intl.  monopoly    -0.046 -0.046 -0.045 -0.058 -0.058 -0.058 
                (1.74)***  (1.74)***  (1.73)***  (2.65)*  (2.64)*  (2.62)* 
Vertical  separation  -0.067 -0.069 -0.069 -0.100 -0.103 -0.099 
                (1.39)  (1.41)  (1.42)  (2.11)**  (2.13)**  (2.08)** 
Log Income   -0.090  -0.070  -0.060  0.488  0.549  0.573 
                (0.24)  (0.19)  (0.16)  (1.50)  (1.65)  (1.68)*** 
Log  Foreign-born    0.561 0.561 0.550 0.584 0.569 0.530 
                (2.49)**  (2.48)**  (2.45)**  (1.93)***  (1.85)***  (1.68)*** 
Log Tourists   -0.042  -0.044  -0.046  0.028  0.033  0.033 
                (0.46)  (0.48)  (0.50)  (0.17)  (0.19)  (0.19) 
Log  Fixed  lines/pop    0.366 0.374 0.376 0.499 0.505 0.491 
                (1.69)***  (1.72)***  (1.72)***  (1.66)***  (1.67)***  (1.63) 
Inflation 25+     0.051  0.052    0.102  0.101 
                  (0.68)  (0.68)    (1.81)***  (1.78)*** 
Left-wing     -0.026      -0.044 
                    (0.48)      (0.84) 
Constant    3.436 3.407 3.416 2.321 2.187 2.157 
                (2.42)**  (2.41)**  (2.41)**  (1.89)***  (1.76)***  (1.73)*** 
N    271 271 271 196 196 196 
Countries  54 54 54 51 51 51 
Estimation OLS  OLS  OLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 
p-value Hausman test
a n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.610  0.614  0.707 
R-squared (within)  0.3951  0.3960  0.3965  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Notes: Panel data estimation with country fixed effects and year dummies. Robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and within country correlation.  
Absolute value of t-statistics in parenthesis. * = 99 percent confidence; ** = 95 percent confidence; *** = 90 percent confidence.  Potentially endogenous 
variable in specifications 4 to 6 is Log fixed lines/pop.  Instruments are: Log Urban and Log Paved roads in addition to all the exogenous variables above. 
a Hausman test of endogeneity.  Ho: Instrumented variable is exogeneous. P-value is the probability of rejecting Ho incorrectly. 16 
 
concluded in the context of the U.S. experience: “Mandatory structural separation is 
unnecessary because the putative benefits that it would produce are, in fact nonexistent.” 
As expected, monopoly on international service significantly lowers international 
telephony usage.  Using the results from 2SLS estimation I am able to reject the null 
hypothesis H02 with 99 percent confidence, while using the OLS results I can reject this 
with 90 percent confidence.
22  The other variables have the expected sign and for the 
most part are highly significant.  Table 3 reveals that my conclusions regarding monopoly 
and vertical separation are fairly stable.  I test further the robustness of these results using 
specification five.  Instead of using monopoly on international service I use the average 
number of years of monopoly in all three basic services (Basic monopoly); the main 
results (not reported) continue to hold.  I also estimate this equation without the year 
dummies and my conclusions are not altered (not reported).  
Using specification five I estimate the negative impact of vertical separation and 
monopoly on international telephony.  An additional year of vertical separation reduces 
the amount of international telephony usage by 10.3 percent, while one additional year of 
monopoly is associated with a 5.8 percent decline on international telephony usage all 
other things constant. 
 
 
3.2 Effect of vertical separation and monopoly on local fixed telephony 
 
I proceed to test other two common assertions made in the pre-privatization years:  
(1) monopoly helps advance universal telephone service (through cross subsidization); 
and (2) allowing competition on basic services would lead to a break down of the cross-
subsidy scheme and thus an increase on residential local rates.  I test the following null 
hypotheses: 
H03: Monopoly on local fixed telephony is associated with more lines in service. 
H04: Monopoly on local fixed telephony is associated with lower residential telephone 
rates.  
                                            
22 See also Wallsten (2004) for similar findings with a smaller sample and using OLS estimation. 17 
 
Again I use panel data estimation with country fixed effects.  I estimate equation one 
using the natural logarithm of fixed lines per person in country i at time t as my 
dependent variable (yit).  In matrix wit I include again my two policy variables: monopoly 
and vertical separation.  As before, I include in matrix xit observations of a set of 
exogenous variables that affect the quantity demanded of fixed lines per person. For 
example, I include the real income per capita, the degree of urbanization, and the density 
of paved roads.  Urbanization and road density should affect the cost of digging trenches, 
laying cables, erecting telephone poles, and so on.  Assuming a central office with a fixed 
switching capacity of say, ten thousand lines,  as the network expands toward less 
densely populated areas or areas less accessible by paved roads (especially in less 
developed countries) the marginal cost per line should increase; this in turn would reduce 
the amount of lines in service holding other things constant.  I also add a dummy variable 
to control for high inflation because getting approval for rate increases could be a lengthy 
process.  This lag would cause the real price of phone services to decline and the amount 
of lines in service to increase. Inflation however, could also have the opposite effect on 
the number of lines in service.  If price adjustments continue to trail inflation, soon 
profits will fall along with new investment to expand the telephone network.  The net 
effect of inflation on fixed lines is therefore ambiguous.  I also add a variable to control 
for political stability.  Given that the provision of fixed telephone service involves large 
sunk costs my dependent variable may be susceptible to political instability as this would 
tend to discourage investment.
23 From the Polity IV database I use the durability of 
political regimes as an indicator of political stability.  I expect a positive relationship 
between political stability and fixed lines in service.  Finally, I add the number of mobile 
phones per person (in logs) because studies have shown that fixed and mobile phones 
could be closed substitutes (Gruber and Verboven 2001, Sung and Lee 2002).  Except for 
this last variable, all others seem to be strictly exogenous.  It seems highly unlikely that 
the current or past values of the number of fixed lines in service would cause an increase 
on income, migration to cities, or more paved roads being built.  Neither would it change 
political stability or inflation. However, the level of past fixed lines in service may affect 
                                            
23 See for example Barro (1991) and Brunetti (1997) on the effect of political instability on investment and 
economic growth.  18 
 
the future number of mobile phones which violates strict exogeneity.  This may occur for 
example if these goods are substitutes or complements.  To overcome this potential 
problem I use two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation.  As instruments for mobile 
phones per person (in logs) I use all the exogenous regressors in xit plus the amount of 
vehicles per person (in logs).  Vehicles per person should be partially correlated with 
mobile phones per person and partially uncorrelated with fixed lines per person.  As the 
amount of vehicles increases, the demand for mobile phones should increase.  The results 
from the first-stage regression (see column two in appendix) suggests that vehicles per 
person (in logs) is a suitable instrument because its coefficient is highly significant and 
exhibit the expected sign. Again, I include year dummy variables and a dummy variable 
to control for a left-wing chief executive.  I found evidence of first-order serial 
correlation in the error terms within clusters and therefore, report robust standard errors.   
I also use Hausman procedure (Hausman 1978, 1983) to test whether mobile phones per 
person (in logs) could plausibly be regarded as endogeneous.  Surprisingly, I cannot 
reject the hypothesis that it is exogenous. Therefore, Table 4 shows the results using OLS 
and 2SLS estimation.  
  Using the results from either OLS or 2SLS I cannot reject the null hypothesis H03; 
monopoly appears not related to the quantity of telephone lines per person.  Wallsten 
(2004) found similar results in a related study with a smaller sample.
24  Notice however, 
the significant negative effect of vertical separation on fixed lines in service per person.  
Vertical separation not only harms the provision of downstream international service but 
also the upstream local fixed service.  This finding suggests that vertical separation 
engenders inefficiencies in the production of (the upstream) local access service and these 
are passed onto the production of (the downstream) international service.  Three things 
may be influencing this; first, transaction costs to coordinate investment decisions 
between upstream and downstream firms on assets that are specific or interrelated 
increases.  Second, vertical separation increases the uncertainty to the downstream firm 
on the supply of essential inputs from the upstream firm.
25  As firms try to contract to 
                                            
24 In a different study Wallsten (2001) use the number of mobile operators as a proxy for competition and 
finds that competition is positively associated with the number of fixed lines in service. The sample 
included state-owned and private telephone firms. 
25 See Arrow (1975) for the effect of uncertainty on the incentive on firms to integrate vertically. 19 
 
reduce uncertainty, transaction costs would increase for both firms, and investment would 
fall. Third, as access fees between upstream and downstream firms are regulated; firms 
will use resources on rent seeking activities (Tullock 1967, Posner 1975) reducing 
productive efficiency and investment on network expansion. 
The coefficients of the other regressors have the expected sign but for the most 
part lack significance.  It is evident from Table 4 that my conclusions regarding 
monopoly and vertical separation are fairly robust.  I test the robustness of these results 
further by using specification four and changing the monopoly variable to monopoly in 
all basic services (Basic monopoly). The results are unchanged (not reported).  I also 
estimate this equation without the year dummies and the main conclusions continue to 
hold (not reported).  Next, I use specification four in Table 4 to estimate the negative 
impact of vertical separation on the quantity of fixed lines in service per person. Each 
additional year of vertical separation reduces the amount of fixed lines per person by 0.8 
percent. 
Finally, I assess the effect of monopoly and vertical separation on the price of local 
residential telephony.  As stated before, monopoly was justified to keep local residential 
rates low through cross-subsidization.  Specifically, I test the null hypothesis H04 stated at 
the beginning of this sub-section: H04: Monopoly on local fixed telephony is associated 
with lower residential telephone rates.  Again I use panel data estimation with country 
fixed effects.  I estimate equation one using the natural logarithm of the price of local 
residential telephony in country i at time t as my dependent variable (yit).  As before, I 
include in matrix wit observations of my two policy variables (monopoly and vertical 
separation) and in matrix xit I include observations of a set of exogenous variables that 
affect the price of residential local telephony.  Most of the variables included in xit appear 
to violate strict exogeneity.  For example, I include the number of fixed lines in service 
and expect a negative relationship between price and quantity. However, quantity can 
also affect price and therefore it should be treated as endogeneous.  Other variables that 
appear to violate strict exogeneity are: the number of faults per line, and the degree of 
digitalization of the local fixed network.  Past prices of local service may affect the future 
quality (i.e., faults per main line) of the phone service.20 
 
Table 4: Effect of monopoly and vertical separation on fixed lines per person 
  Dependent Variable = Log fixed lines/pop 
     Variable   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Local  monopoly      -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.066 -0.074 -0.060 
                (0.66)  (0.62)  (0.72)  (0.81)  (0.83)  (0.81) 
Vertical  separation    -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 
                (5.49)*  (4.82)*  (5.15)*  (2.26)**  (1.92)***  (2.55)** 
Log  Income    -0.055 0.067 -0.040 -0.096 0.131 -0.060 
                (0.22)  (0.30)  (0.17)  (0.35)  (0.48)  (0.23) 
Log  Urban    2.403 1.886 2.442 3.231 2.400 3.177 
                (3.06)*  (2.27)**  (3.07)*  (2.38)**  (2.23)**  (2.35)** 
Log  Paved  roads    0.027 0.009 0.028 0.133 0.113 0.118 
                (0.28)  (0.10)  (0.32)  (0.72)  (0.67)  (0.71) 
Durable    0.011 0.013 0.011 0.026 0.030 0.023 
                (0.90)  (1.03)  (0.90)  (1.09)  (1.19)  (1.15) 
(Durable)
2    -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004 
                (2.10)**  (2.39)**  (2.13)**  (1.89)***  (1.92)***  (2.10)** 
Inflation 25+   -0.053    -0.056  -0.092    -0.091 
                (2.09)**    (1.95)***  (1.37)    (1.36) 
Log Mobile   0.070  0.074  0.065  -0.074  -0.088  -0.062 
                (3.11)*  (2.92)*  (2.54)**  (0.37)  (0.40)  (0.33) 
Left-wing     0.023  0.027  0.057  0.055 
                  (0.54)  (0.59)    (0.75)  (0.75) 
Constant   -11.155  -9.305  -11.375 -15.013 -12.181 -14.836 
                (3.51)*  (2.79)*  (3.57)*  (2.52)**  (2.50)**  (2.49)** 
N    141 141 141 141 141 141 
Countries  40 40 40 40 40 40 
Estimation  OLS OLS OLS 2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 
p-value Hausman test
a  n.a. n.a. n.a.  0.478  0.447  0.493 
R-squared  (within)  0.801 0.798 0.803  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Notes: Panel data estimation with country fixed effects and year dummies. Robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and within country (cluster) correlation.  Absolute value of t-statistics 
in parenthesis. * = 99 percent confidence; ** = 95 percent confidence; *** = 90 percent confidence. Potentially endogenous variable in specifications 4 to 6 is Log Mobile.  Instruments are: Log 
Vehicles in addition to all the exogenous variables above.
a Hausman test of endogeneity.  Ho: Instrumented variable is exogeneous. P-value is the probability of rejecting Ho incorrectly. 21 
 
 For example, if regulators force the firm to price below cost, profits will decline along 
with the quality of service.  Something similar may occur with the degree of 
digitalization. Past prices of phone service may affect the ability of firms to upgrade the 
telephone network.  To avoid endogeneity problems I use two-stage least squares 
estimation.  As instruments I use all the exogenous regressors plus the degree of 
urbanization, the density of paved roads, and a measure of political stability.  As stated 
before, highly urbanized areas and the abundance of paved roads should lower marginal 
and average cost of production and thus have a positive effect on the number of lines in 
service.  The same should be true for the adoption of digital technology because 
upgrading the network should cost less in urban areas and areas with abundance of roads. 
I expect a positive partial correlation between digitalization and these two instruments.  I 
also expect the third instrument: political stability, to be positively related with the 
number of fixed lines and with digitalization because both represent investment on 
infrastructure.  As it was mentioned before, investment can be sensitive to political 
instability (Barro 1991, Brunetti 1997).  The effect of these instruments on the number of 
faults per lines in service is harder to predict.  I posit that the availability of roads and a 
higher degree of urbanization may help reduce the cost of repairs and maintenance and 
thus lower the number of telephone faults.  On the other hand, political stability should be 
related with higher investment and this includes expenditures on network maintenance, 
repairs, and upgrading.  I expect political stability to be negatively correlated with the 
amount of telephone faults. These instruments seem to have adequate properties as they 
should be partially correlated with the three instrumented variables but unlikely to be 
correlated with the price of local residential telephony.  The results of the first-stage 
regressions (see columns 3 to 5 in appendix) supports this assertion because for the most 
part they are partially correlated with the instrumented variables and have the expected 
sign.  Again, I include year dummy variables and a dummy variable to control for the 
existence of a left-wing chief executive.  I also find evidence of first-order serial 
correlation in the error terms within clusters and therefore, report robust standard errors. 
The results of Hausman’s test (Hausman 1978, 1983) of endogeneity suggest that the 
three instrumented variables are indeed endogenous.  The p-values of Hausman test 
appear on Table 5 at the bottom.  Using specification four I reject exogeneity with 99 22 
 
percent confidence and using the other two specifications I can only reject exogeneity 
with 80 percent confidence.  For comparison purposes I present the OLS and 2SLS 
results. 
  Using the results of 2SLS estimation I reject the null hypothesis H04 with more 
than 90 percent confidence level.  Monopoly in local telephony is associated with higher 
prices not lower prices of local residential telephony.  The pre-privatization fear that a 
sharp increase on the prices of the subsidized residential service would follow the end of 
monopoly was unwarranted.  Even AT&T’s chairman Charles Brown (cited in Temin 
1987: 307) agreed with the conventional view: “with competition, this subsidization of 
local rates by AT&T’s long distance service is no longer possible and will be gradually 
phased out. Long distance rates will come down, and local rates will rise.”  Analysts 
underestimated the power of private property and competition to enable gains in 
productive efficiency that would more than compensate private investor’s appetite for 
above marginal cost pricing in the post-privatization years. 
The lack of significance in the coefficient of vertical separation suggests that it 
has no effect on the price of local residential telephony.   However, if we take into 
account that vertical separation also reduces the number of lines in service per person 
(see Table 4) it seems clear that the net effect of vertical separation on local service is 
negative.  Other results indicate that the degree of digitalization and the number of fixed 
lines in service have the expected sign and are highly significant while the coefficients of 
the other regressors lack significance.  The results are fairly robust to alternative 
specifications.  Using specification five and changing the monopoly variable to indicate 
monopoly in all basic services (Basic monopoly) does not alter the conclusions (not 
reported).  Changing the dependent variable to an alternative indicator of the price of 
residential telephony; Res price1 (see Table 1 for definition), does not alter my 
conclusions (not reported).  Using specification five in Table 5, I estimate that each 
additional year of monopoly increases the price of residential local service by 9.6 percent 
holding all else constant. 
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Table 5: Effect of monopoly and vertical separation on the price of local residential fixed telephony. 
  Dependent Variable = Log Res price2 
     Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Local  monopoly    0.056 0.067 0.056 0.109 0.096 0.108 
                (1.18)  (1.49)  (1.20)  (1.92)***  (2.17)**  (1.89)*** 
Vertical  separation    -0.018 -0.021 -0.018 -0.016 -0.012 -0.016 
                (0.73)  (0.89)  (0.77)  (0.84)  (0.60)  (0.82) 
Log  Income    0.960 0.449 1.016 0.437 0.514 0.496 
                (0.99)  (0.40)  (1.08)  (0.36)  (0.38)  (0.40) 
Log  Fixed  lines  -0.529 -0.488 -0.541 -1.601 -1.360 -1.608 
                (2.14)**  (2.02)**  (2.19)**  (2.36)**  (1.94)***  (2.32)** 
Log Faults   -0.068  -0.070  -0.068  -0.012  0.007  -0.029 
                (1.05)  (1.18)  (1.05)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.10) 
Digital    0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.020 0.024 0.020 
                (0.36)  (0.49)  (0.25)  (2.20)**  (1.77)***  (2.10)** 
Log Pop 0-14     -4.547      3.198   
                  (1.66)***      (0.80)   
Left-wing       0.115    -0.068 
                    (1.04)      (0.54) 
Constant   3.641  19.704  3.527  3.976  -6.994  3.940 
                (1.64)  (1.88)***  (1.63)  (1.57)  (0.49)  (1.45) 
N    273 273 273 201 201 201 
Countries  54 54 54 48 48 48 
Estimation OLS  OLS  OLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 
p-value Hausman test
a n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.199  0.002  0.209 
R-squared (within)  0.197  0.233  0.204  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Notes: Panel data estimation with country fixed effects and year dummies. Robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and within country (cluster) 
correlation.  Absolute value of t-statistics in parenthesis. * = 99 percent confidence; ** = 95 percent confidence; *** = 90 percent confidence.  Potentially 
endogenous variables in specifications 4 to 6 are Log Fixed lines, Log Faults, and Digital.  Instruments used are Log Urban, Log Paved roads, Durable, and 
(Durable)
2 in addition to all the exogenous variables above. 





Two myths have been dispelled analyzing the post-privatization experience of 
telecommunications around the world. The first myth is that monopoly on basic 
telephone services is needed to maintain low (subsidized) prices of local residential 
telephony.  The second myth is that vertical separation between the local fixed network 
provider and that of downstream services such as international telephony (or long 
distance) is needed to boost competition and output in these markets.  The empirical 
evidence shows that monopoly increases the price of residential service.  Moreover, it 
also harms downstream (international) markets by reducing the usage of international 
telephony.  Therefore, monopolizing basic telephone services does not advance the stated 
policy of universal service; it retards it.  Vertical separation also harms universal service 
provision by reducing the number of fixed lines per person.  In addition, vertical 
separation reduces the usage of downstream international service.  In summary, 
monopoly and vertical separation reduce social welfare and harm those consumers that 
were precisely designed to help: the downstream (business) users of international 
telephony and the upstream users of residential local telephony.  The findings in this 
article could help illuminate current policy discussions on the desirability of vertical 
separation in telecommunication (see for example OECD 2003).25 
 
APPENDIX: Results of first-stage regressions (from Tables 3, 4 and 5) 







Variables  Log Fixed lines/pop  Log Mobile  Log Fixed lines  Log Faults  Digital 
Intl. monopoly  -0.006 
(0.70) 
    




























Log Foreign-born  -0.262 
(1.57) 
    
Log Tourists  0.073 
(1.07) 
    
























   

















Log Vehicles    1.213 
(1.74)*** 
   

















N 196  141  201  201  201 
Countries 51  40  48  48  48 
Notes: Panel data estimation with country fixed effects and year dummies. Robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and within country (cluster) 
correlation.  Absolute value of t-statistics in parenthesis. * = 99 percent confidence; ** = 95 percent confidence; *** = 90 percent confidence.  The dependent 
variables in this table are the instrumented variables that appear in Tables 3, 4, and 5. 
a First-stage for specification 5 in Table 3. 
b First-stage for specification 4 in Table 4. 
c First-stage for specification 5 in Table 5. 27 
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